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Reforming Divorce: What's Needed and
What's Not
Marsha Garrison*
The New York Matrimonial Commission was appointed in
2004 by Chief Judge Judith S. Kay to "examine every facet of
the divorce and custody determination process" and to "recommend reforms to reduce trauma, delay and cost to parents and
children ...."I There can be little doubt that Judge Kay's initiative was needed. Divorce affects tens of thousands of New
Yorkers each year and, all too often, the divorce process is unnecessarily lengthy, expensive, and painful. These problems
can, and should, be addressed.
However, the Commission's recommendations lack the capacity to effectively address the problems Judge Kay identified.
Although the Commission was undoubtedly well intended, it
failed to examine the reasons that divorce is expensive, slow,
and painful. Because its recommendations do not address these
root causes, they offer almost nothing in the way of a meaningful remedy.
Had the Commission investigated, it would have found that
the major sources of delay, expense and litigation-induced pain
are complex divorce procedures and highly discretionary entitlement rules. 2 The combination of these rules and procedures
offers litigants very little capacity to predict their divorce entitlements or even to prepare the appropriate forms. The reforms
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Research for this article was supported by Brooklyn Law School's Faculty Research Fund.
1. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT TO THE

(February 2006), http://www.courts.
state.ny.us/reports/matrimonialcommissionreport.pdf, reprinted here as Appendix
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

A [hereinafter MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT].
2. When a couple has minor children, these problems are magnified. Minor
children create the need to reach agreement on a larger array of issues, open the
door to post-divorce disagreement and resulting litigation, and enhance the likelihood that one spouse will suffer a major living-standard loss after divorce. In this
brief article, I focus exclusively on entitlement rules and divorce procedures that
affect couples with and without minor children; I do not address the particular,
and larger, problems of couples with minor children.
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proposed by the Commission do not attempt to improve predictability or reduce complexity, nor do they have the capacity to
achieve these goals. The Commission's efforts thus represent a
failed opportunity. Like many recent divorce "reforms," its various recommendations are likely to benefit divorce lawyers and
other divorce professionals far more than they benefit divorcing
couples and their children.
I.

Divorce Delay, Expense, and Distress: How Do These
Problems Arise?

A.

The "Typical" Divorce

As the Commission Report notes, divorce is by far the most
common form of civil litigation in New York. Literally seventyfive percent of statewide court filings (excluding the Surrogate's
Court) relate to matrimonial actions, and this figure doesn't
even include more than 40,000 uncontested divorces that are
3
sought each year.
New York's Office of Court Administration does not collect
data about the characteristics of couples who file for divorce, let
alone analyze such data to inform divorce-reform efforts. National survey data suggest that the "typical" New York divorce
litigant is young and has been married for a relatively short period. Nationally, in 2001, the median age of men and women
divorcing for the first time was less than thirty-two; the median
4
marital duration at divorce was eight years.
Young couples divorcing after short marriages rarely accumulate substantial assets. When I studied divorce in three New
York counties two decades ago, 5 the median net value of marital
3. Id. at 4. See also N.Y. UNIFIED CT. Sys., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 10, 13 tbl. 10
& fig.3 (2006).
4. See RosE M. KREIDER, NUMBER, TIMING AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND
DIVORCES: 2001, at 8-10, tbls. 8-9 & app. A (2005) (citing U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Rep. 70-97). These data are based on the national Survey of Income Programs and Participation (SIPP) and thus represent weighted estimates.
Id. at 16.
5. See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New
York's Equitable DistributionLaw on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621
(1991) [hereinafter Good Intentions]; Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An EmpiricalAnalysis of DiscretionaryDecision Making, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 401 (1996) [hereinafter Discretionary Decision Making].
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7
assets subject to division was only $18,2666 or $31,604 in 2004.
And this was a sample in which contested cases-the wealthiest
segment of the total divorce pool 8-were substantially overrepresented. Despite the overrepresentation of relatively
wealthy couples, eighteen percent of the total sample had negative net worth, i.e., their debts exceeded their assets. 9 Most of
the sample did not own professional degrees, licenses, business
assets, or even pensions; fifty-nine percent of overall marital
property value for the contested case sample was represented
by home equity, household goods, and a car. 10
There is nothing unusual about my mid-1980s divorce sample. The scarcity of marital property was first reported in 1956
in a pioneering study of divorce in Detroit, Michigan; forty percent of the divorcing couples surveyed in this study had no property beyond household possessions, and only eighteen percent
had property worth $4,000 or more." The same phenomenon
was "rediscovered" by several other researchers looking at divorce outcomes in other states during the same time period in
2
which I was looking at divorce in New York.'

One reason the typical divorcing couple has so little to divide is that the divorce population is disproportionately composed of young couples who are just starting out in life. Another
important factor is the disproportionate concentration of divorce among low-income couples. In the United States, divorce
is literally twice as likely among couples living below the pov6. See Good Intentions, supra note 5, at 662 tbl.12.
7. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AVERAGE ANNUAL CONSUMER PRICE INDEX RESEARCH
SERIES USING CURRENT METHODS (CPI-U-RS) - ALL ITEMS: 1947 TO 2004 (2005),
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/incomeO4/cpiurs.html (last
visited Apr. 28, 2007).
8. See Good Intentions, supra note 5, at 659.
9. See id. at 659 tbl.8.
10. See id. at 665 tbl.15, 666 fig.1. Asset values could not be determined for
couples in the default and consent groups because these couples were not required
to file net worth statements. See id.
11. See WILLIAM J. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 217 (1956).

12. See BARBARA BAKER, FAMILY EQUITY AT ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1987); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); James B. McLindon,
Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disasterof Divorce for Women and Children,
21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987).
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erty line as it is among the general population. 13 Divorce is also
negatively correlated with educational attainment. 14 Income
and education are, of course, highly correlated with savings,
and it is savings that produce assets.
The many divorcing couples who are relatively poor are
highly vulnerable to divorce-induced economic hardship. Divorce has the capacity to push the couple that was barely making it over the edge into not making it all. The reason is simply
that two households cannot live as cheaply as one; thus the federal poverty level for a family of three is approximately fifty5
percent less than that of a family of one plus a family of two.'
Because divorce divides a formerly unified household into two
parts-with two separate bills for rent, utilities, the car payment - it ensures that one, if not both, portions of the nowdivided family will experience a living-standard loss. And such
a loss is most difficult to absorb if, as in the typical divorce case,
the family has a low income and relatively few assets.

13. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STUDIES IN HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY FORMATION:
WHEN HOUSEHOLDS CONTINUE, DIScONTINuE, AND FORM 18-21 (1992) (Current
Population Reps. Series P23-180). See also WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN

DIVORCE PATTERNS 154-55 (1993) (summarizing research on the relationship between socioeconomic class and divorce rates).
14. Non-marital birth is also more common among the poorly educated. See
David T. Ellwood & Christopher Jencks, The Spread of Single-ParentFamilies, in
THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 25, 37 fig.2.7 (Daniel P. Moynihan et al. eds., 2004).
See also Douglas W. Allen & Margaret F. Brinig, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Child Custody, U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05.25, availableat http:fl
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=82014 (last visited Apr. 28, 2007)
(reporting, for a 1997-2002 Oregon divorce sample composed of couples with minor
children, that the mean number of years of education for both wives and husbands
was thirteen); Dan Hurley, Divorce Rate: It's Not as High as You Think, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at D7 (reporting unpublished data showing that the ten-year
divorce rate for college graduates "has plummeted to just over [sixteen percent] of
those married between 1990 and 1994 from [twenty-seven percent] of those married between 1975 and 1979").
15. See U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Thresholds 2005, available at http:l!
www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh05.html (last visited Apr. 28,
2007).
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How New York's Divorce Law Exacerbates Delay, Expense,
and Pain
1.

Divorce Bargaining: A Divorce Law that Casts No
Shadow

New York's current divorce law exacerbates the hardship
that divorce necessarily produces in several different ways. The
first is by making it extraordinarily difficult for couples to understand and reach agreement about their divorce rights and
obligations.
Divorcing couples reach-or fail to reach-agreement
about property division and spousal maintenance by bargaining
"in the shadow of the law": their negotiations are informed by
their understanding of a likely resolution if the case were to go
to trial. 16 But when legal rules are highly discretionary and imprecise, they cast a blurred shadow that impairs each spouse's
ability to determine his or her legal entitlements and reach a
mutual understanding about those entitlements. Instead of
consensus on case outcome, each litigant may reach very different expectations, thus exacerbating the difficulty of forging a
negotiated settlement. Indeed, it may be impossible for the
couple to reach consensus, producing yet more trauma, expense
and delay.
New York's rules governing property distribution and
spousal maintenance offer the divorcing couple no predictability
whatsoever. For spousal maintenance, the Domestic Relations
Law specifies that "the court may order temporary maintenance
or maintenance in such amount as justice requires, having regard for the standard of living of the parties established during
the marriage, whether the party in whose favor maintenance is
granted lacks sufficient property and income to provide for his
or her reasonable needs and whether the other party has sufficient property or income to provide for the reasonable needs of
the other and the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties."1 7 The court is also directed, in determining the
amount and duration of maintenance, to consider ten factors
16. The classic account of divorce bargaining is contained in Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
17. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236B(6)(a) (McKinney 2006).
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that together take account of spousal need, resources, contribution to the marriage, and economic misconduct.' 8 A catch-all
clause additionally permits consideration of "any other factor
which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper." 19 In
sum, the statute directs the judge to base the maintenance decision on an appraisal of the parties' past conduct, present needs,
and future life circumstances, but leaves the scope, methodology and use of that appraisal to judicial discretion.
The statutory rules governing marital property distribution
follow a similar pattern. The judge is directed to distribute the
property "equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties." 20 Equity
is to be determined based on judicial consideration of twelve
21
soup-to-nuts factors, plus the same catch-all clause.
18. In determining the amount and duration of support the court shall
consider:
(1) the income and property of the respective parties including marital property distributed pursuant to subdivision five of this part;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
3) the present and future earning capacity of both parties;
(4) the ability of the party seeking maintenance to become self-supporting
and, if applicable, the period of time and training necessary thereof;
(5) reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance as a result of having foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities during the marriage;
(6) the presence of children of the marriage in the respective homes of the
parties;
(7) the tax consequences to each party;
(8) contributions and services of the party seeking maintenance as a spouse,
parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of
the other party;
(9) the wasteful dissipation of marital property by either spouse;
(10) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial
action without fair consideration ....

Id.
19. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(6)(a)(11) (McKinney 2006).
20. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(5)(c) (McKinney 2006).
21. In determining the equitable disposition of property ... the court shall
consider:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the
time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
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New York's spousal maintenance and property division
rules thus embody the ideal of the equity court. In pursuit of
individualized equity, they grant the trial judge more discretion
22
than does any other field of private law.
I do not mean to suggest that New York is unusual in this
respect. Only a handful of states require equal division of marital property or have adopted a presumption in favor of equal
division; 23 the others direct "equitable" division, typically based
on a list of factors akin to that devised by the New York legislature. 24 Spousal maintenance statutes are more diverse, but
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and
to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made
to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title,
including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a
spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career
potential of the other party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any
interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party;
(10) the tax consequences to each party;
(11) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;
(12) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial
action without fair consideration;
(13) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236B(5)(d) (McKinney 2006).
22. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary
Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1986) ("Family Law
...is characterized by more discretion than any other field of private law.").
23. Only a few states require equal division of marital property. See CAL.
FAM. CODE § 2550 (Deering 2006). A few others, like Arkansas, have established a
rebuttable presumption in favor of equal division. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315
(2006). See generally THOMAS J. OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 13-8.1 n.9 (listing state regimes).
24. For a comparison of state equitable distribution laws, see OLDHAM, supra
note 23, at §§ 13-9 to 13-24.1.

7
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many share the imprecision of New York law. 25 Although the
predicament of New York divorce litigants thus is not unique, it
is real: highly discretionary standards simply cannot provide as
much certainty to litigants who seek to settle their cases as
would rules. Discretionary standards may leave weak spouses
more vulnerable to strong-arm negotiating tactics. 26 Invariably,
they impede settlement and, thus create delay, expense, and
27
anxiety.
2.

Negotiation and Paperwork: Complexity that Creates
the Need for Expert Guidance

Because New York's divorce law itself offers virtually no
guidance on litigation outcomes, divorcing couples are dependent upon the expertise of lawyers or other experts in assessing
their litigation prospects. 28 These experts can often offer liti25. See Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Applying
an Income Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
23, 24 (2001) (categorizing state alimony-determination factors).
26. See, e.g., Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participationand Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautionsfrom the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & Soc's REV. 585, 59698 (1987) ("In divorce, the same flexibility that allows generosity and creative arrangements also allows emotional intimidation, asset-hiding, and the exertion of
financial leverage."); Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 978-80 (discretionary rules disadvantage the more risk-averse party and offer greater opportunities
for strategic behavior).
27. Most litigation models suggest a higher litigation rate when the law is
uncertain. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of
Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1092-93
(1989); George L. Priest, MeasuringLegal Change, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193 (1987).
See also Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Conflict in Divorce Disputes: The Determinants of PretrialSettlement, 21 IN'rL REV. L. & ECON. 157, 176 (2001) (testing
predictions of various litigation models in a sample of divorce cases and concluding that "the results suggest that the more uncertainty about the outcome, the
more likely a couple goes to court").
28. See, e.g., Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 16, at 979 (Under uncertain
standards, "[a] lawyer may be necessary simply for a person to learn what his bargaining chips are."). For descriptions of the lawyer's role in the settlement process,
Participationand Flexibility in Informal Processes:
see Howard S. Erlanger et al.,
Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAw & Soc'¥ REV. 585, 598-602 (1987);
Marygold S. Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation:An Exploratory Investigation
in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133, 1144 (1988); Herbert
Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26 LAw & Soc'y REV. 565 (1992); Austin
Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness:Law Talk in the
Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1661 (1989); Austin Sarat & William L.F.
Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & Soc'y REV.
93 (1986).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss4/13

8

2007]

REFORMING DIVORCE

929

gants more information about likely case outcome, but consulting such experts takes time. It also consumes money-far more
money than many divorcing couples can afford.
In the early 1990s, curious about just what it would cost a
"typical" couple-let us call them Mr. and Mrs. Smith-to obtain a no-frills divorce, I had a student call ten different law
firms listing divorce as a specialty in the Brooklyn, Manhattan,
and Queens yellow pages. The student asked each firm's representative the "likely cost" of representing the Smiths in an uncontested divorce and told the firm's representative that the
Smiths had been married for five years, were childless, and
owned no property except a joint bank account, a car, furniture,
and a jointly owned condominium apartment which would be
sold, with an equal division of the proceeds. Estimates to handle the Smiths' divorce ranged from $459 to $1,770; the mean

was

$931.29

For a "typical" divorce litigant like Mr. or Mrs. Smithmarried for only a few years and with marital assets consisting
of a used car, household goods, limited home equity, and a small
bank account 3 0-the price of legal representation may well exceed any loss in post-divorce entitlements that lawyer representation could have averted. 31 Certainly, a $1,000 fee will
significantly reduce the value of their meager assets available
for division. It is also worth noting that, for couples like the
Smiths who have managed to agree on their entitlements, legal
representation comes down to a $1,000 paper-preparation fee
unaccompanied by any possible equity or efficiency gain.
Couples like the Smiths are extremely numerous. Researchers have found that the majority of divorcing couples re29. See DiscretionaryDecision Making, supra note 5, at 516 n.387.
30. See sources cited supra note 10 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis,
42 DuKE L.J. 557, 571 (1992) ("Individuals acting in their self-interest will acquire
such [legal] advice only if its perceived value exceeds its perceived cost."). Researchers report that self-representation at divorce hearing is significantly correlated with income, age, whether the marriage produced children, propertyownership and marital duration. See Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a
ReasonableAlternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 553, 561-66 (1993); Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode, The Unauthorized Practiceof Law and Pro Se Divorce:An EmpiricalAnalysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104,
162 (1976) (finding that divorce litigants without children and with short marriages were more likely to self-represent).

9
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solve the terms of their divorce themselves with little conflict. 32
These couples consult a lawyer because they, like "most pro se
[divorce] litigants, [have] . . . problems with forms or procedures, many of which are not resolved by the available written
instructions." 33 These couples "need" a lawyer for the sole pur34
pose of preparing and filing state-mandated paperwork.
Here again, New York law offers no help to typical divorce
litigants. Instead, it mandates the same type of complaint, answer, and agreement in a simple, uncomplicated divorce like
that of the Smiths, involving no disagreement and virtually no
assets, that it mandates in a complex, highly conflicted case in
which millions of dollars are at stake.
3.

Unpredictability Produces Uncertainty and Inequity

Many litigants somehow stumble through the divorce process without legal assistance. We lack data on the number of
unrepresented divorce litigants in New York, but in many
states, at least one divorce litigant is unrepresented in threequarters or more of all divorce cases. 35 The Matrimonial Commission itself notes that, in its meetings with New York matrimonial judges and other experts, "the problem that was
universally highlighted as a substantial barrier to the efficient,
effective and timely movement of contested matrimonial cases
is the number of individuals representing themselves....
Because New York's entitlement rules offer little guidance
to couples making their own deals, these unrepresented couples
are at a decided disadvantage as compared to their represented
peers. Although we have little systematic data on the extent of
the litigation disadvantage that accompanies lack of legal rep32. See

ELEANOR

E.

MACCOBY

& ROBERT H.

MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:

SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 159 (1992) (reporting that threequarters of divorcing couples studied "experienced little if any conflict over the

terms of the divorce decree"); Cavanagh & Rhode, supra note 31, at 138 (reporting
that more than sixty percent of divorcing couples studied had resolved all property,
support, custody and visitation issues themselves).
33. RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE SELF-REPRESENTED DIVORCE LITIGANT 3
(Am. Bar. Ass'n ed., 1994).

34. See Jacob, supra note 28, at 579-81, 584-86 (reporting that many divorcing
couples work out an agreement before approaching a lawyer).
35. See Deborah J. Chase, Pro Se Justice and Unified Family Courts, 37 FAM.
L.Q. 403, 403 (2003) (surveying reports).
36. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 57.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss4/13
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resentation in divorce, it seems unlikely that the judicial norms
which lawyers rely on in negotiating adversarial settlements
carry over as well to the vast group of divorce actions where
couples employ one lawyer to serve primarily as a scrivener, or
no lawyer at all. For example, among my sample of settled
cases, the award of spousal maintenance was highly correlated
with the presence of counsel. Where both parties were represented by lawyers, thirty percent of wives obtained spousal
maintenance; when neither party was represented by counsel,
no wives did.3 7 Self-selection undoubtedly played some role
here. A wife with poor alimony prospects--childless, earning
close to her husband's income, married a short time--is less
likely to hire a lawyer than is the unemployed homemaker who
has been married for a long time to a high income professional.
However, it seems unlikely that self-selection fully explains the
enormous gap between pro se and lawyer-negotiated outcomes.
The price of our current discretionary regime, in more difficult
and time-consuming negotiation, and in inappropriate outcomes that may result from the failure to obtain legal advice,
thus is likely substantial.
These costs are not confined to the unrepresented. New
York's property division and spousal maintenance rules are so
imprecise that even litigated cases may be altogether unpredictable. As part of my study of divorce in New York, I examined
every single trial-court decision on spousal maintenance and
property division reported during the first decade of practice
under New York's 1984 Equitable Distribution Law, some 383
in total. 38 Some entitlement choices were highly predictable.
37. See Good Intentions, supra note 5, at 712-14. Since income information
was available only for the contested group (where two-party representation was
almost invariable) among this broad sample, comparisons by income category were
not possible.
38. All published trial court decisions on alimony and property distribution
were included; sources of published decisions included, in addition to the official
and West reporters, the New York Law Journal and the Family Law Reporter, a
publication of the Family Law Section of the New York State Bar Association. Appellate decisions were utilized to expand the sample: if the trial court's decision on
property distribution and alimony could be determined either from an appellate
decision or the record on appeal, the case was included in the sample. Since the
records on appeal of appellate cases decided in 1990 were unavailable at the time
data collection terminated in August 1992, only trial decisions could be obtained
for the year 1990. The number of 1990 decisions included in the study was thus
smaller than the total for each earlier year.
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Eighty-three percent of alimony-award decisions, for example,
could be predicted with information on the percentage of family
income earned by the wife, the value of her income, marital duration, the value of net marital property, and the husband's job
status;39 indeed, eighty percent of the decisions could be pre40
dicted based simply on the wife's percentage of family income.
But other entitlement decisions were highly unpredictable:
with respect to the length of a durational maintenance award,
not a single litigant characteristic enumerated in the statute as
relevant to the decision was significantly correlated with the
maintenance-award period, and only one percent of the variation in durational periods could be predicted on the basis of any
information in the case records. 4 1 Property distribution also evidenced little predictability. In almost half of the sample cases,
net marital property was divided relatively equally, but less
than fifteen percent of the variation in net property outcomes
42
could be predicted based on the statutory factors.
Not only were many entitlement decisions unpredictable,
but some of the most important predictive variables were extrastatutory factors that should not affect case outcome. For example, at the trial-court level, the most significant predictive
variables for determining whether a spousal maintenance
award was permanent or durational were marital durationrelevant under the statutory formula-and the political party of
the judge who made the decision, a factor that should be altogether irrelevant. 43 Similarly, the value of the maintenance
award was more strongly predicted by the appellate division in
which the case was decided than it was by either spouse's income or the value of the net marital property. 44
If the outcome of litigation is highly uncertain, not even experts can offer clear advice about what constitutes a good or bad
negotiated settlement. Nor does a litigant have any capacity to
judge whether his or her attorney has negotiated a good deal or
a bad one. Indeed, the attorney herself may not know whether
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See DiscretionaryDecision Making, supra note 5, at 483-84 tbl.27.
See id. at 486.
See id. at 489.
See id. at 454 tbl.8, 463-64 tbl.13.
See id. at 488-89 tbl.29.
See id. at 494 tbl.31.
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she has negotiated a good or bad deal; her capacity to judge success will of necessity be confined to what she learns from reported cases, her own practice experience, and her observations.
And if the reported cases fail to reveal clear and consistent patterns, her own limited set of cases and observations will offer
the only "norm" available, a norm that may be normal nowhere
else.
In teaching the basic family law course, I have often required students to negotiate a divorce settlement agreement.
Typically, I have divided the class into teams assigned to represent either the Husband or Wife, who are sometimes played
by other class members and sometimes by students from
outside the class. I give the students who portray the Husband
and Wife detailed instructions on how they should respond to
questions from the various attorney teams assigned to represent them, and I invariably tell the student actors that they
should accept a settlement agreement if the student team says
that it represents a really good deal, or that it is impossible to
negotiate a better settlement. Invariably, the various student
attorney teams assigned to represent a particular spouse reach
wildly different "really good deals" that can't be bettered. When
we review the results of this exercise in class, the range of outcomes is enormous and identical settlements extremely rare.
In a large class, this exercise creates numerous administrative difficulties, but I continue to undertake it because I know of
no other way to so vividly demonstrate to students both the indeterminacy of the current, highly discretionary divorce regime
and the immense power that it confers on divorce lawyers. Because the law offers no guidelines on what represents a fair outcome, divorce litigants must rely on expensive legal experts that
they often can ill afford. Adding insult to injury, the law doesn't
even give them the capacity to judge their lawyer's work.
The costs of such indeterminacy are magnified when a divorcing couple begins negotiations with different preconceptions about their marital history, needs, and relative
contributions. These different perspectives can easily prcduce
fixed, and highly divergent, views of a "fair deal." Without clear
legislative standards against which to test those views, divorce
negotiations can easily degenerate into a continuation of the
marital conflicts that led to divorce proceedings.
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The costs of indeterminacy are also magnified by the sheer
volume of divorce litigation. Divorce today is a routine matter
involving, in the typical case, little conflict and too little wealth
to be worth fighting over. These typical divorce litigants and
their children deserve a simpler, more predictable, and more equitable divorce process, and divorce reform should strive to
achieve such improvements.
II.
A.

Achieving Simplicity, Predictability, and Fairness: What
Reforms Would Be Useful?
The Commission Proposals: The Wrong Targets Produce
the Wrong Results

Strikingly, the Commission offers no proposals whatsoever
aimed at divorce simplification or predictability. It does offer a
few very limited proposals that aim to increase equity or reduce
delay, but even these modest proposals are highly flawed. Indeed, there is real risk that some of these proposals will increase the cost and complexity of divorce.
1.

Enhanced Earning Capacity

The Commission urges only one substantive shift in New
York's indeterminate rules governing property distribution and
spousal maintenance-the elimination of enhanced earning capacity as an asset subject to distribution at divorce. The Commission notes that New York is the only state which permits the
distribution of these "assets." It also notes longstanding concerns about their necessarily speculative value, the cost of the
valuation process, the possibility of "double counting," and the
likely impact of all these difficulties in increasing divorce expense and delay. 45 The Commission is certainly right that other
states have rejected the New York approach to enhanced earning capacity, and for the modest group of individuals affected by
New York's distinctive approach, the concerns identified by the
Commission are real and deserve attention.
However, the Commission's "solution"-legislative elimination of enhanced earning capacity as a divisible asset coupled
with elimination of remarriage as a bar to continued spousal
45. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 66.
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maintenance and mandated consideration of spousal contribution to enhanced earning capacity as a factor in property division 46-is incapable of eliminating the problems identified by
the Commission. Moreover, this "solution" would create new
forms of unpredictability, and it largely ignores the problem
that led the Court of Appeals to conclude that enhanced earning
capacity should be treated as a divisible asset in the first place.
That problem is aptly demonstrated by the facts of O'Brien
v. O'Brien, in which the New York Court of Appeals first authorized the division of enhanced earning capacity.4 7 In
O'Brien, the wife had abandoned her own career aspirations
and worked full-time, for years, toward the acquisition of the
husband's medical degree and license. Two months after that
license was awarded-and before the husband had a valuable
medical practice or had acquired valuable assets-the husband
filed for divorce. 48 The O'Brien court thus confronted a case in
which there were virtually no marital assets other than the
husband's enhanced earning capacity, and a skilled, self-supporting wife who was not a traditional candidate for spousal
maintenance. 49 In a case like O'Brien, mandated consideration
of spousal contribution to enhanced earning capacity in determining the division of marital property is a meaningless remedy: even one-hundred percent of zero is still zero. Nor does
elimination of the remarriage bar to receipt of maintenance offer much to a spouse like Mrs. O'Brien. First, the proposed reform would not require the trial court to award Mrs. O'Brien
maintenance; indeed, it is unclear whether a court should
award maintenance to a spouse like Mrs. O'Brien given New
York courts' longstanding emphasis on need and marital duration as the most important factors in determining whether
maintenance should be awarded. 50 Second, maintenance is invariably subject to modification: if Mrs. O'Brien goes back to
school and enhances her own earning capacity, or if Dr. O'Brien
is injured or becomes ill and loses earning capacity, or if any of a
46. Id.
47. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).

48. Id.
49. The Court of Appeals noted that the parties' "only asset of any consequence is the husband's newly acquired license to practice medicine." Id. at 713.
Mrs. O'Brien was a teacher with a Bachelor's degree.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
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dozen other possibilities materialize, she may lose the maintenance she was awarded.
Many states have seen spousal maintenance as the appropriate remedy for the Mrs. O'Briens of the divorce world, but
the typical reform has been legislation that establishes a fairly
definite entitlement to so-called "reimbursement alimony." California, for example, not only permits, but requires reimbursement "for community contributions to education or training of a
party that substantially enhances the earning capacity of the
party. The amount reimbursed shall be with interest at the legal rate, accruing from the end of the calendar year in which the
contributions were made."5 ' Providing even more detailed guidance, the legislature has specified that the amount to be reimbursed "shall be reduced or modified to the extent
circumstances render such a disposition unjust, including, but
not limited to ...":
(1) The community has substantially benefited from the education, training, or loan incurred for the education or training of the
party. There is a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of
proof, that the community has not substantially benefited from
community contributions to the education or training made less
than 10 years before the commencement of the proceeding, and
that the community has substantially benefited from community
contributions to the education or training made more than 10
years before the commencement of the proceeding.
(2) The education or training received by the party is offset by the
education or training received by the other party for which community contributions have been made.
(3) The education or training enables the party receiving the education or training to engage in gainful employment that substantially reduces the need of the party for support that would
52
otherwise be required.
The statute also explicitly excludes educational loans from marital liabilities, assigning these debts to the spouse whose educa53
tion the loan financed.
Where the Matrimonial Commission offers a new factor
that would conceivably, but by no means definitely, permit a
51. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641(b)(1) (Deering 2006).
52. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641(c) (Deering 2006).
53. CAL. FAM.CODE § 2641(b)(2) (Deering 2006).
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Mrs. O'Brien to obtain a "larger" share of what may be nothing
and a possibility, but no certainty, of obtaining some spousal
maintenance, of uncertain value and duration, the California
legislature has offered a clear and predictable entitlement. The
California statute is sufficiently precise that litigants can ascertain the likely value of that entitlement and determine whether
it will be available in their own cases. By contrast, the Matrimonial Commission's proposal doesn't even identify the measure of
the new claim it would establish: Should the entitlement be
based on the value of the contributions to the degree, as in California, or the value of the enhanced earning capacity that results, as is now the case in New York? The proposal doesn't
offer a clue, with the result that litigants should still be forced
to value enhanced earning capacity. Should the court ignore
older contributions to avoid double-counting, as does the California statute? Should it offset degrees? Again, the proposal offers no guidance whatsoever. In sum, the Commission
approach fails to eliminate unpredictability, double-counting,
and valuation problems, and it creates the very real possibility
that spouses like Mrs. O'Brien will be left holding the bag. This
is not a useful reform proposal.
A scheme like that enacted by California would be a useful
reform. In contrast to the Commission proposal, the California
legislation simply and successfully avoids the problems of speculative valuation and double counting; because of these merits
and the clear guidance it provides to litigants, it also has the
capacity to significantly reduce the expense and delay identified
as major problems by the Matrimonial Commission. Its clear
guidance should also increase outcome predictability and
consistency.
2.

Process Reforms

Although its enhanced-earning-capacity proposal is the
only substantive shift in New York law that the Commission
proposes, it does urge a number of procedural reforms. These
proposals, like the enhanced-earning-capacity proposal, largely
ignore the real problems and thus offer little in the way of
meaningful solutions. Indeed, there is real risk that some of
these proposals will increase the cost and complexity of divorce
without achieving any measurable benefit.
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Some of the Commission's process recommendations are
poorly targeted but nonetheless unobjectionable. For example,
the Commission recommends improved court facilities, more
and better court personnel, and a better selection process and
training for judges, court-appointed lawyers and court-appointed experts. 54 All forms of litigation would probably benefit
from better facilities and better personnel; these recommendations are certainly harmless. However, most of the personnel
and facilities benefits would be realized by divorcing couples
who actually litigate-a tiny fraction of the total pool of divorce
cases-and vague injunctions to improve personnel and facilities leave unidentified both the types of improvement that are
necessary and how those improvements should be obtained.
Moving a bit beyond vague nostrum, the Commission urges
early screening and case classification in order to track cases
according to their likely resource requirements and complexity,
greater use of alternate dispute resolution (ADR), and an initiative to "move strongly against divorce mills by, among other
things, coordinating with local bar associations to provide free
legal services to self-represented litigants."55
For the small pool of contested cases, early screening may
be useful if it does not add yet another layer of complexity to an
already complex process. However, we have little concrete evidence about the capacity of screeners to reliably sort cases into
appropriate categories or the factors that enhance those capacities. Early screening is certainly worth trying and testing, but
well-designed research, using random selection and control
groups, is essential if optimal results are to be achieved.
The same problem-the possibility of more, not less, complexity-is inherent in the Commission's proposal to increase
the use of ADR. ADR programs tend to produce a fairly high
level of user satisfaction, but we lack evidence that such programs in fact reduce cost and delay. ADR programs have typically been initiated on faith and without controlled research.
We thus do not know what percentage of couples who reach

54. See MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at v, x-xii.
55. Id. at vi-vii, xii. The Commission additionally suggests new court rules
requiring the award of interim counsel fees to a relatively poor spouse.
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agreements through mediation would likely have reached
56
agreements without mediation.
Nor do we know whether mediation produces a "better" or
more durable settlement, and some evidence suggests that we
should be wary of this assumption. Research conducted in New
York during the 1990s found that child-custody mediation was
far more likely to produce a joint custody award than was an
attorney-negotiated or judicially assisted settlement; eightyfour percent of the mediated settlements contained some type of
joint custody arrangement, as compared to thirty-seven percent
of attorney-negotiated and forty-seven percent of judicially assisted cases. Moreover, thirty-seven percent of mediated, 15.8
percent of attorney-negotiated, and 17.6 percent of judicially assisted agreements specified joint physical custody, and many of
these joint physical custody agreements included provisions for
reduced or no child support. 57 Yet nine months post-divorce,
joint physical residence had been maintained in less than half
of the surveyed cases; where a shift occurred, it almost invariably produced de facto mother custody. The researchers thus
concluded that women who mediated a custody dispute were economically disadvantaged as compared to women who used
other dispute-resolution mechanisms.5 8 The largest and most
thorough evaluation of joint custody to date, conducted in California, made similar findings; 59 the California researchers also
found that parental conflict enhanced the likelihood that joint
custody would emerge as a mediated outcome 60 and that, "[ilf
parents were initially conflicted, there was little chance that
they would become cooperative with time." 61 Concerns have
56. See generally Joan B. Kelly, A Decade of Divorce Mediation Research, 34
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 373, 375-76 (1996); Connie J.A. Beck & Bruce D.

Sales, A Critical Reappraisal of Divorce Mediation Research and Policy, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 989 (2000).

57. See Carol Bohmer & Marilyn L. Ray, Effects of Different Dispute Resolution Methods on Women and Children After Divorce, 28 FAm. L.Q. 223 (1994).
58. Id.
59. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 32, at 159, 290 (reporting that, in
about half of high-conflict joint physical custody cases, children in fact resided with
their mothers and expressing concern that "on occasion a divorce mediator may
push reluctant parents to accept joint physical custody arrangements as a
compromise").
60. Thirty-six percent of joint physical custody cases in this sample involved
"substantial or intense legal conflict." Id. at 150-51 tbl.7.6, 159.
61. Id. at 248.
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also been raised about the propriety of mediation in cases in
which there has been a pattern of domestic violence or domination of one spouse by the other.62 In sum, ADR may be a
cheaper and less-time consuming alternative to traditional case
processing in some divorce cases, but further research is needed
to know how and when mediation alters case outcomes and the
extent to which those alterations negatively affect outcome equity. Any initiative to increase the use of ADR should include a
carefully designed research component to make these
determinations.
The Commission's recommendations with respect to pro se
litigants, on the other hand, are a move in the right direction,
but one that doesn't go anywhere near far enough. Much more
than "coordinating with local bar associations" to increase the
availability of legal services to pro se litigants is needed. Many
states have undertaken such comprehensive and carefully designed initiatives. 63 California, for example, initiated a "Unified
Courts for Families" program that not only aimed to increase
lawyer resources for pro se litigants-and provided millions of
dollars in funding for that representation-but also expanded
or initiated programs to provide family law facilitators, family
law information centers, and self-help centers. The program
additionally created a Task Force on Self-Represented Litigants
to coordinate a statewide response and six "mentor" courts to
test different strategies for meeting the needs of unrepresented
litigants. 64 This type of statewide, multi-dimensional and wellfunded response stands a chance of reducing divorce delay, cost
and pain for the many low-income couples making their way
through the divorce process without legal representation. An
initiative limited to coordinating with local bar associations
does not.
62. See, e.g., Fiona Raitt, Domestic Violence and Divorce Mediation, 18 J. Soc.
& FAM. L. 11 (1996); Holly Joyce, Mediation and Domestic Violence: Legislative Responses, 14 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 447 (1997).
63. See Chase, supra note 35, at 403.
64. See id. See generally Judicial Council of California Administrative Office
of the Courts, Unified Courts for FamiliesDeskbook: A Guide for CaliforniaCourts
on Unifying and CoordinatingFamily and Juvenile Law Matters (2004), available
at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/UCFdeskbook.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2007).
WELFARE

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss4/13

20

2007]

REFORMING DIVORCE

B. Reducing Divorce Delay, Expense, and Pain: What
Reforms Can Succeed?
So, what reforms should the Commission have proposed to
reduce divorce delay, expense, and pain?
1.

Simplified Divorce Procedures

A good beginning would be court rules or legislation that
authorize greatly simplified divorce procedures in uncontested
cases where public concerns are minimal and legal counseling is
highly unlikely to produce a major benefit to either party. A
number of states have already adopted so-called "summary dissolution" procedures of this type. For example, in California,
couples without children who have been married for fewer than
five years may obtain a summary dissolution of their marriage
if their post-marital debts do not exceed $4,000 (excluding automobile loans), the "total fair market value of community property assets, excluding all encumbrances and automobiles,
including any deferred compensation or retirement plan, is less
than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), and neither party
has separate property assets, excluding all encumbrances and
automobiles, in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000)."65 Such a couple may use a state-approved form to
execute a simple agreement that sets forth the division of their
assets and liabilities and verifies that they have executed any
documents required to achieve that division. Six months after
the submission of this form to the appropriate court, a motion
by either party will produce a divorce judgment; no further
66
paperwork or court appearances by either party are necessary.
Oregon has a summary-dissolution procedure that applies to
couples married as long as ten years and possessing as much as
67
$30,000 in assets.
As a first step to reducing the divorce delay and expense,
New York should adopt such a scheme. Ideally, it would deviate
from the California model by eliminating the post-submission
motion to obtain a divorce judgment; there is no reason why a
65. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2400(a)(7) (Deering 2006).
66. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2406 (Deering 2006).
67. See OR. REV. STAT. § 107.485 (2006). Oregon's scheme also permits one
spouse to unilaterally initiate a summary-dissolution divorce. See id.
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joint petition should not automatically generate a divorce decree sent by mail to each party. Nor is there any reason why a
couple should be precluded from using summary dissolution for
68
the sole reason that they have some limited home equity.
New York should also look to other states that have initiated comprehensive, statewide programs to meet the needs of
pro se divorce litigants. Innovations like family law facilitators
and information centers likely could play a significant role in
easing couples' difficulties in obtaining appropriate divorce outcomes. In order to obtain the best and most cost-effective package, these and other innovations should be trialed in selected
locations and studied, using randomly selected samples and
control groups.
2.

Improving Outcome Predictability and Consistency

Another obvious reform is changes in New York's divorce
entitlement rules that would curb outcome inconsistency and
enable litigants to make reasonably accurate predictions about
their divorce entitlements. The rationale for continued reliance
on extensive factor lists and unchannelled judicial discretion is
the heterogeneity of values and fact patterns that must be accommodated in divorce decisionmaking, 69 but my research described in Part I showed that, for some entitlement decisions,
New York judges in fact rely heavily on a few key variables that
do not hinge on a complex, individualized appraisal of relative
merit. It also showed that, for other decisions, the statutory
factors play no discernible role in determining case outcome.
The evidence thus suggests that the current factor lists are either unnecessary or counterproductive; it is time for a simpler
and more predictable approach.
68. Like automobile loans, education debts should also be eliminated from the
post-marital debt pool relevant to whether summary dissolution is available. In
California, these loans are not considered community debts. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2641(b)(2) (Deering 2006). The summary dissolution procedure booklet should
also make clear that such debts are assigned to the spouse who obtains the corollary benefit.
69. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 65 (1983) ("[Divorce] law
...is now largely based on the assumption that the infinite variety of circumstances is such that the attempt to lay down general rules is bound to lead to
injustice. Justice can only be done by the individualized, ad hoc approach .... ").
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Some of the obvious reforms are straightforward and unlikely to provoke controversy. In my research report on judicial
decision making, published more than a decade ago, I noted
that:
Alimony decision making is a good reform target because key
facts can be identified that explain a substantial majority of alimony decisions and that suggest presumptions altogether compatible with the principles underlying the current discretionary
standard. To state legislatively a presumption in favor of alimony
for the long-married spouse whose earnings (and earning capacity) constitute a relatively small fraction of family income ...
would simply describe current judicial outcomes .... Such pre-

sumptions comport with-and would clarify-the principles that
underlie the existing discretionary statute, in addition to enhancing the predictability of case outcomes.
Property division is another obvious reform target due to the
strength of the equal division norm and the conformity of this
norm with the statutory principles. Under a standard premised
on the view of marriage as a partnership of equals, and with more
than half of all cases ultimately resulting in a relatively equal division of net assets, there is no obvious justification for failing to
is the most typical outcome,
specify that relatively equal division
70
or an analytical starting point.
Such reforms "rest upon values that the legislature has already
adopted and thus require no more than a willingness to codify
current decision-making patterns . .

.

.The extent of judicial

consensus on these issues also suggests that broad public sup71
port for these limited reforms would be available."
My research data also pointed to some narrower entitlement-determination issues where legislative guidance would
not likely prove to be particularly controversial. For example,
cases involving businesses and professional practices were
strongly overrepresented in the sample, 72 suggesting the need
for clearer standards on appropriate valuation methods and
70. Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 5, at 521-22. "Eighty-eight
percent of wives married ten or more years who earned less than [thirty percent] of
family income were awarded alimony." Id. at 521 n.410.
71. Id. at 522.
72. For instance, "[a] business, professional practice, or degree figured in
[thirty-eight percent] of the cases decided by judges." Id. at 523 n.413.
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separate/marital property apportionment. 73 Judges also used
dissipation, sugconflicting methods to resolve cases of asset 74
approach.
standardized
a
for
need
the
gesting
Even this modest package of reforms would offer considerable guidance to divorce lawyers and the many divorce litigants
who determine their own divorce entitlements without adversarial legal representation. By helping judges to focus on the
appropriate circumstances for deviation from clearly stated
norms, the reform package should also enhance the development of useful precedents, as well as the likelihood of consistent
outcomes in which like persons are accorded like treatment. Finally, this modest package should enhance what legal scholars
have variously described as the hortatory or expressive function
of the law. 75 By expressing the normative principles that underlie divorce entitlements in more concrete, accessible form,
the power of those principles to shape goals and conduct is
expanded.
Modest reforms that codify current practice and resolve
narrow issues will not, of course, enable divorcing couples to
fully predict their entitlements. Recall, for example, that deviation from a relatively equal division of marital net worth, the
length of a durational spousal-maintenance award, and the
value of a maintenance award were all largely unpredictable
based both on the statutory factors and other available case
data. For these issues, the development of clearer standards
cannot rest on current practice; instead, it will require value
judgments, and there will likely be disagreement on how competing values should be accommodated. Consider, for example,
my finding that judicial property-division awards were significantly correlated with asset values; departures from equal division tended to benefit the needier spouse at the bottom of the

73. Many were small, closely-held family businesses that would not be sold
and/or had no obvious market value. Id. at 523 n.414.
74. See id. at 464-65 n.235.
75. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, The ChannellingFunction in Family Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992); Jennifer Wriggins, MarriageLaw and Family Law:
Autonomy, Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265,
293-301 (2000). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021 (1996).
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wealth chart and the spouse who had made greater monetary
76
contributions at the top.
A presumption of equality that applied regardless of asset values
would, conversely, advance the interests of wealthy women at the
expense of their poorer-and far more numerous-counterparts
.... Is it appropriate to prefer the needier spouse at the bottom of
the socioeconomic ladder; is it appropriate to prefer the asset-producing spouse at the top? Is wealth an appropriate basis for departure from equality at all? If it is, to what extent and how? 77
In order for New York's divorce law to optimally guide divorce
settlement negotiations, the legislature must confront and resolve difficult questions like this one.
Moreover, the only reason we know that judicial propertydivision awards exhibited the pattern I have just described, is
because I undertook the research to find out. Reforms that are
based on flawed assumptions are highly likely to produce
flawed results. For example, New York's 1980 Equitable Distribution Law was predicated on the assumption that wives were
typically disadvantaged by the former approach to property distribution, based on title. 78 The reformers seem to have expected
that any diminution in spousal maintenance produced by the
new, "rehabilitative" alimony concept that was enacted along
with the elimination of title-based property distribution would
be offset by larger property awards. However, I discovered that
the assumptions that underlay the Equitable Distribution Law
were inaccurate: husbands did own valuable property more
often than wives, but the difference in the median net value of
wife- and husband-owned property was only $800. Moreover,
because husbands also tended to have larger debts than wives,
the median net worth of wives was slightly higher than that of
husbands. And for the typical couple, the property of both husbands and wives was almost completely overshadowed by
jointly held assets, divisible under both regimes. 79 The passage
of the Equitable Distribution Law thus was not accompanied by
any clear increase in the median or average percentage of net
76.
77.
78.
79.

See DiscretionaryDecision Making, supra note 5, at 460 tbl. 12.
Id. at 524.
See Good Intentions, supra note 5, at 653.
See id. at 636 tbl.7.
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marital assets wives obtained,80 but wives' prospects of obtaining a spousal maintenance award, particularly a permanent
8
award, declined dramatically after the Law's enactment. '
New York's entitlement rules should be revised to provide
greater predictability and outcome consistency, but in order to
avoid unanticipated results, legislative change should be predicated on a clear and accurate understanding of current
outcomes.
3.

Research

The final obvious reform is more and better research on divorce patterns and outcomes. This research is now extraordinarily time-consuming and difficult. Were divorcing couples
required to fill out a short scannable form, it would be extraordinarily easy. Such a form would not affect case confidentiality,
as no identifying information would be necessary. Moreover, divorcing couples already provide all, or virtually all, of the
needed information as a precondition to obtaining divorce;
transferring that information to a scannable form accessible to
researchers would be a simple matter.
Tabulation of these simple, easily completed forms would
provide a wealth of data to inform the divorce-reform process
and ensure that it produces the desired results. Even relatively
straightforward measures, like providing resources to pro se
couples, are inhibited by the lack of available data. At this
point, we do not know how many couples divorce without any
legal representation or how many employ one lawyer primarily
as a scrivener. We do not know whether the outcomes in these
cases deviate from those obtained when couples are represented
by legal counsel. We do not know anything about the characteristics of these couples, nor do we know what proportion have
minor children, who add to the complexity of the divorce
process.
How can one effectively design services to meet the needs of
a population about whom one knows absolutely nothing? How
can one reduce delay without information about who exper80. See id. at 673-74 tbls.18-19.
81. See id. at 697-98 tbls.36-37.
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iences delay and how it occurs? How can one solve any problem
without accurate information about its causes?
In sum, if the New York court system is serious about reducing divorce expense, delay, and distress, it first needs to obtain accurate and detailed information about the individuals
who use the court system to end their marriages. That information is crucial not only for identifying problems, but also for
testing, comparing, and refining strategies to address those
problems. Data collection thus should take precedence over all
other reform possibilities.
III.

Conclusion

The available evidence suggests that the major sources of
divorce delay, expense, and litigation-induced distress are complex divorce procedures and highly discretionary entitlement
rules; together, such rules and procedures prevent divorcing
couples from accurately predicting their divorce entitlements
and even from preparing their own paperwork. The reforms
proposed by the Commission do not attempt to improve predictability or reduce complexity, nor do they have the capacity to
achieve these goals. A better reform model would emphasize
simplified divorce procedures for cases where public concerns
are minimal and simplified entitlement rules that would increase both the predictability and consistency of case outcomes.
The reform package should also include statewide, multi-faceted services directed at pro se litigants. However, any reform
initiative should begin with routine, statewide data collection to
inform this and future reform efforts.
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